Threat Assessment & Management (TAM) Team Primer

Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT)





August 2022

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TEAM PRIMER

CONTENTS

Introduction					
What Are Threat Assessment and Management Teams?					
How Do We Know TAM Teams Work?					
Ten Key	Steps in the Creation of a Community-Wide TAM Team	4			
1.	Identify a Lead Agency with a "Champion" to Support TAM Team Development	4			
2.	Obtain Executive-Level Support Within Jurisdiction	4			
3.	Identify Core Agencies Critical to the TAM Team	5			
4.	Engage with Core Agencies	5			
5.	Conduct an Initial Overview Meeting	6			
6.	Participate in an Initial Program Analysis (IPA)	6			
7.	Create Memorandum of Understanding and/or Legal Agreement	6			
8.	Conduct TAM Training	7			
9.	Engage in Broader Stakeholder Outreach	8			
10.	Participate in Regular TAM Team Meetings	8			
Five Key	/ Lessons Learned in New York State TAM Team Creation1	.0			
1.	Executive Support is Critical 1	10			
2.	Leveraging Existing TAM Team Models in New York State May be Helpful	1			
3.	Identifying a Strong TAM Team Leader is Key1	1			
4.	Ongoing Threat assessment & Management Training is Crucial	1			
5.	TAM Team Evolution is Continual	1			
Conclusion					
Appendices					

INTRODUCTION

On May 14th, 2022, a domestic terrorist, motivated by a conspiracy-driven white-supremacist ideology, attacked Black Americans at Tops Friendly Markets Store in the East Side neighborhood of Buffalo, killing ten and injuring three others. In response to this heinous terrorist act, on May 18th, 2022, Governor Hochul signed Executive Order No. 18 (EO 18) entitled "Preventing and Responding to Domestic Terrorism." In accordance with EO 18, every New York State (NYS) county and the City of New York ("Jurisdictions") must develop and maintain a domestic terrorism prevention plan ("Plan") to identify and confront threats of domestic terrorism.¹ The State expects that the creation of Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) teams will be a critical pillar of Jurisdictions' Plans. *Please see the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan Guidance for specific considerations*.

Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) teams are multi-disciplinary teams that bring together law enforcement, mental health professionals, school officials, and other community stakeholders to identify, assess, and manage threats of targeted violence. The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) defines targeted violence as "a premeditated act of violence directed at a specific individual, group, or location, regardless of motivation and generally unrelated to other criminal activity." For our purposes, targeted violence includes all types of terrorism (both foreign and domestic), hate crimes, mass killings, and other violent acts against a specific individual, group, or organization. From a definitional standpoint, targeted violence generally excludes spontaneous acts and violence associated with other criminal activity including interpersonal violence, street or gang-related crimes, violent crimes perpetuated by organized crime syndicates or similar organizations, and financially motivated crimes.

This primer provides key information on how to create a TAM team and offers example documents from existing NYS TAM teams to support local TAM team development across the State.

WHAT ARE THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TEAMS?

 TAM teams are multi-disciplinary teams that bring together law enforcement, mental health professionals, school officials, and other community stakeholders to identify, assess, and manage threats of targeted violence.

¹ Executive Order 18: Preventing and Responding to Domestic Terrorism


- These teams receive reports of concerning behavior by individuals, gather additional information, assess the risk of potential violence, and then develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate the risk of violence individuals displaying the concerning behavior pose.
- The teams seek to take a "public health" approach by engaging a broad group of stakeholders to examine the potential risk and protective factors at play and develop mitigation measures that ideally resolves the concern before a crime is committed that would necessitate direct law enforcement involvement. At their best, these teams operate with restorative models and seek to intervene before law enforcement involvement is required.
- Respect for individual rights and civil liberties is paramount to the work of these teams.
- The teams' focus must always be on the subject's behavior, and not the underlying ideology that may appear to rationalize the behavior.

HOW DO WE KNOW TAM TEAMS WORK?

The U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and numerous researchers all recommend the use of TAM teams as a viable and critical tool to help address targeted violence. Use of TAM teams are supported by research that shows most individuals who commit targeted violence do not "snap;" rather, they generally follow a discernable pathway to violenceⁱ and display warning signs along the way. Moreover, numerous studies show that most perpetrators of targeted violence "leak" their plans or intent prior to the attacks.ⁱⁱ By recognizing what this pathway looks like and creating opportunities for bystanders to report "leaked" plans, practitioners may identify opportunities to provide off-ramps before a violent act occurs.

TEN KEY STEPS IN THE CREATION OF A COMMUNITY-WIDE TAM TEAM

DHSES has worked with existing TAM teams already operating in New York State – ROCTAC (Monroe County), BUFTAC (the City of Buffalo), and NITAG (Niagara County) – to identify ten key steps for Jurisdictions to consider as they develop a community-wide TAM team:



Ten Key Steps to Create a TAM Team

1. IDENTIFY A LEAD AGENCY WITH A "CHAMPION" TO SUPPORT TAM TEAM DEVELOPMENT

Each community-wide TAM team currently operating in New York State started with a lead agency to coordinate efforts and a leader in that agency to "champion" this process.

2. OBTAIN EXECUTIVE-LEVEL SUPPORT WITHIN JURISDICTION

Executive-level support is critical to the development of an effective TAM team. Jurisdictions that are planning to develop a team must engage senior leadership across key agencies, including elected officials (i.e., County Executive, Mayor, or another Chief Executive). TAM teams without executive level support are unlikely to succeed. DHSES leaders are available to work with you to engage local and county executives on the importance of the TAM team model.

3. IDENTIFY CORE AGENCIES CRITICAL TO THE TAM TEAM

Once a lead agency is identified and executive support has been obtained, the lead agency must develop a list of core organizations that will be critical to successful TAM team efforts. While this list will be unique to each Jurisdiction, similarities have emerged in TAM team membership in New York State and include, but are not limited to:

- Mental Health Offices and/or Mental Health Professionals
- School Superintendents, Safety Representatives, and/or School Resource Officers from both K-12 and colleges in the area.
- Local Law Enforcement Agencies
- Domestic Violence Shelter representatives
- The New York State Police (NYSP)
 - Note: The NYSP have designated Counterterrorism Investigative Unit (CTIU) Investigators in each Troop that can be a resource for TAM team efforts. The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) is also a critical partner in this effort
- Family Court Representatives
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - Note: The FBI has a dedicated Threat Management Coordinator (TMC) in each Field Office. The TMCs in the Albany, Buffalo, and NYC Field Offices can be a resource to support TAM team efforts.
- The United States Secret Service
- The Humane Society
- Probation Officials
- The District Attorney's Office
- Security Officials from Higher Educational Institutions
- Veteran's Groups
- Key Private Sector Employers in the Jurisdiction

4. ENGAGE WITH CORE AGENCIES

After the list of core agencies is identified, the lead agency must identify an official in a leadership position from each agency and directly engage with them. The purpose of this coordination is to introduce the concept of a TAM team, to ask each agency to send a representative to participate in an initial overview meeting, and to provide basic information on the importance of this effort. A sample email can be found in Appendix A of this document.

5. CONDUCT AN INITIAL OVERVIEW MEETING

The lead agency must host an initial overview meeting to further introduce the concept of a TAM team and to highlight the importance of this effort. This meeting can be held in-person or virtually and DHSES can support the meeting (with information and recommendations) if requested. As part of this meeting, the lead agency should strongly consider engaging an existing TAM team to provide an overview of their team, meetings, best practices, and lessons learned. At the end of the meeting, the lead agency should ask each agency to provide a dedicated point of contact with whom to work on TAM team efforts. *A sample meeting agenda can be found in Appendix B of this document.*

6. PARTICIPATE IN AN INITIAL PROGRAM ANALYSIS (IPA)

As part of the TAM team development process, DHSES recommends that the Jurisdiction creating the team participate in an Initial Program Analysis (IPA). The IPA process is designed to capture information about a Jurisdiction's efforts to create a TAM team, including a review of existing efforts and resources that can be used to support the effort, and potential challenges to TAM team implementation. This process takes approximately 2-3 hours and can be done virtually. The IPA is a series of questions to capture basic information at the outset of the TAM team development process. *Sample IPA questions can be found in Appendix C of this document.*

7. CREATE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND/OR LEGAL AGREEMENT

Jurisdictions creating a TAM team will need a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or other legal agreement in place, to guide the team's efforts, ensure compliance with State and local laws, and address privacy considerations. A Jurisdiction's legal counsel may find it helpful to confer with an attorney supporting an existing TAM team. DHSES can facilitate that communication. Having a legally sufficient MOU in place between TAM team participating organizations will protect the rights of the parties and address legal or privacy concerns. A sample MOU can be found in Appendix D of this document. Appendix D is provided as a sample and should not be used as a substitute for legal review and approval by the participating entities' respective legal counsel.

8. CONDUCT TAM TRAINING

Training is a critical component of an effective TAM team development. While a great deal of time and effort has been spent on physical assessment training since 9/11, TAM training is new to many stakeholders. Jurisdictions creating TAM teams will need to train TAM team participants. Examples of such training include:

- <u>Recognizing and Identifying Domestic and Homegrown Violent Extremism (AWR-409)</u>
 - Provider: National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT)
 - Description: Awareness-level course that explores violent extremism in the US. Participants are taught to identify, assess, and counter the threat of violent extremism.
 - Duration: 1 day
 - o Delivery Method: In-person/Virtual
 - Target Audience: Broad array of public safety officials
 - Cost: No cost
 - Access Options: Non-state entities can make requests through the Jurisdiction's Emergency Manager to put a request into New York Responds (NYR), New York State's emergency management system. State entities can request training directly from DHSES Office of Emergency Management at <u>oem.training@dhses.ny.gov</u>.
- <u>Community Awareness Brief (CAB)</u>
 - Provider: DHS Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3)
 - Description: Course is part of the DHS I&A National Threat Evaluation and Reporting (NTER)
 Program
 - o Duration: 3 hours
 - o Delivery Method: In-person/Virtual
 - o Target Audience: Broad audience-whole community
 - o Cost: No cost
 - Access Options: Jurisdictions can request training through DHS CP3 by emailing <u>CP3Field@hq.dhs.gov</u>.

Additional training may be available through vendors, or at no cost, through DHSES or the federal government.

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TEAM PRIMER

9. ENGAGE IN BROADER STAKEHOLDER OUTREACH

As a TAM team prepares to "launch," engagement with stakeholders is a critical step. This ensures the TAM team is transparent and facilitates reporting from its stakeholders that will serve as a driver for future threat cases presented for TAM team consideration. From the very beginning of planning, Jurisdictions should consider how best to publicize the creation and purpose of the TAM team to increase engagement with potential stakeholders. This may include press releases, paid advertising, the use of social media, or other means of getting the word out.

10. PARTICIPATE IN REGULAR TAM TEAM MEETINGS


After the steps above have been completed, the next step is to conduct a TAM team meeting. If a participating member agency has a threat case to share, that agency should notify the lead agency and share the individual's name and date of birth, if possible. Each participating member agency should review any records they have that may be pertinent to that individual (if applicable) and be prepared to provide information and advice to the agency that is bringing the threat case forward.

- <u>Opening Statement for TAM Team Meetings</u>: An opening statement helps set the tone and rules for the meeting. ROCTAC developed an opening statement that is read at the beginning of each TAM team meeting; *please refer to Appendix E*.
- <u>Information-Sharing</u>: It is important to note that each participating member agency must continue to abide by their own agency's information-sharing protocols and policies while participating on a TAM team. Further, teams should ensure familiarity with any State and federal laws that may limit how, and when, certain personal information may be shared.
- Threat Case Management: Based on the existing TAM team models in New York State, the participating member agency that brings a threat case forward **does not transfer responsibility for that case to another** participating member agency during a meeting. Rather, the participating member agency that brought forward the threat case will receive information, advice, and resources from other participating member agencies on the TAM team to better support the individual(s) involved in the threat case.
- <u>Data Management</u>: Each TAM team must be prepared to track and provide basic information to DHSES on a quarterly basis regarding their team's efforts. This includes:
 - Number of TAM team meetings
 - Number of threat cases opened
 - Number of Referrals for outside Services (e.g., Mental Health, Substance Abuse)

- Number of threat cases referred to law enforcement
- Number of threat cases closed
- Any qualitative case studies, without personal identifiable information (PII), demonstrating the impact of the TAM team

DHSES will never ask for PII or privacy protected information on a specific case. We will only ever require aggregate and/or anonymized information.

Note: The existing TAM teams in New York State generally do not create independent records for threat cases that are addressed. While threat cases are tracked at a high-level (as outlined above), the participating member agency that brought the case forward is responsible for all files and record keeping relative to the threat case based on their existing agency protocols



FIVE KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN NEW YORK STATE TAM TEAM CREATION

1. EXECUTIVE SUPPORT IS CRITICAL

The support of a Jurisdiction's executive leadership is critical to the success of TAM teams. However, it can be difficult to demonstrate the value of an entity (i.e., a TAM team) that is tasked with helping to prevent a bad act before it occurs. TAM teams should remain engaged with executive leadership and be prepared to articulate their value and highlight success stories.

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TEAM PRIMER

2. LEVERAGING EXISTING TAM TEAM MODELS IN NEW YORK STATE MAY BE HELPFUL

Reach out to partners in other Jurisdictions who have developed successful TAM teams. Leverage their knowledge, expertise, and lessons learned in your planning discussions. There is no need to re-invent the wheel: consider modifying their processes to suit your jurisdictional needs. Look to other advisory groups within your jurisdiction that may have similar partnerships (e.g., school safety teams, opioid task forces, etc.) as a starting point and build membership from there.

3. IDENTIFYING A STRONG TAM TEAM LEADER IS KEY

Having a leader devoted to the TAM team is essential to ensure consistency and commitment to the mission. These leaders are key to the coordination process – look to staff that may have an interest in this unique mission, has prior experience in crisis management, and a background dealing with complex threat cases.

4. ONGOING THREAT ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT TRAINING IS CRUCIAL

Keeping your TAM team trained will require ongoing attention. Ensuring that all team members have baseline Threat Assessment Management training is an important component and key to success. This type of training is continually evolving. It is therefore critical to keep current with advanced training opportunities and new prevention strategies as your TAM team develops.

5. TAM TEAM EVOLUTION IS CONTINUAL

TAM team operations are continually advancing. Threat Assessment and Management is a skillset that requires ongoing training and practical applications – this is a critical component to ensure the long-term success and sustainment of a TAM team. It is equally important for your TAM team to remain flexible, as the team may look much different in the early stages compared to how it functions when cases are referred, and membership is expanded.

CONCLUSION

The DHSES' Office of Counter Terrorism appreciates your ongoing efforts in preventing domestic terrorism and targeted violence across New York State. We recognize that each Jurisdiction is unique and differs in their domestic terrorism prevention efforts. It is our hope that this primer, and its resources, support your jurisdiction's effort to develop a TAM team.

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TEAM PRIMER

Please direct questions regarding TAM teams to: PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Sample Email to Engage Core Agencies

Appendix B: Sample Agenda for Initial Overview Meeting

Appendix C: Sample Initial Program Analysis (IPA) Questions

Appendix D: Sample Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

Appendix E: Sample TAM Team Meeting Opening Statement

ⁱ Calhoun, F., & Weston, S. (2003). Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing, and managing individuals of violent intent.

ⁱⁱ Silver, J., Horgan, J., & Gill, P. (2018). Foreshadowing targeted violence: Assessing leakage of intent by public mass murderers. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 38, 94-100.

SAMPLE EMAIL TO ENGAGE CORE AGENCIES

Good morning/afternoon,

The ENTER AGENCY NAME is reaching out regarding the creation of a **Threat Assessment and Management (TAM)** team in ENTER REGION NAME. The purpose of this team is to increase information-sharing across a variety of governmental and non-governmental partners in the area to prevent acts of domestic terrorism and targeted violence. This effort is being supported by the NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) and is modeled off successful efforts currently operating in the state. We think your agency's participation in the TAM Team that's being created in our area would be beneficial to our collective efforts to reduce the risk of domestic terrorism and targeted violence.

The ENTER AGENCY NAME, in conjunction with DHSES, will host a brief conference call later this month (date to be announced) to explain this effort further, including the responsibilities of a TAM Team, expectations for participating member agencies, and next steps in this effort for the region.

Please identify a Point of Contact (POC) within your agency that we can reach out to with further information about this effort, including details on the conference call described above. If you have any initial questions, please don't hesitate to reach out. Thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely,

ENTER POC NAME

INITIAL OVERVIEW MEETING – SAMPLE AGENDA					
Introductions5 minutes					
NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES)					
Welcoming Remarks5 minutes					
Agency that is Leading the Effort					
Overview of Executive Order 18 and Associated TAM Efforts					
DHSES					
Overview of an Existing TAM Team in NYS					
A representative from an existing TAM Team					
Next Steps for the TAM Team20 minutes					
Agency that is Leading the Effort					

INITIAL PROGRAM ANALYSIS (IPA) SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR EACH REGION

EXISTING EFFORTS

Review of Existing Efforts: Please describe your current efforts in terms of targeted violence and terrorism prevention. This could include efforts such as crisis intervention teams, active Counter Terrorism Zone (CTZ) participation, etc.

Current Strengths and Perceived Gaps: In terms of your existing efforts, what are your biggest strengths? What do you perceive as your most pressing gaps?

Team Structures Currently: Does your agency, jurisdiction, or region have any form of a TAM Team in existence now? If yes, please provide an overview of your TAM Team efforts to date.

BUILDING A TAM TEAM IN YOUR REGION

TAM Team Foundations: As you start to conceptualize a comprehensive TAM Team for your region, what does it look like? What agencies are involved? Is a "lead" agency identified? Is it countywide or could a broader regional approach be considered?

Executive Support: Executive support and "buy-in" is critical to the success of a TAM Team. Which leader (or leaders) is the "face" of your region's TAM Team? Do you have their support now for this effort?

Community Engagement: Community engagement and support is also critical to TAM Team success. As you start thinking about a TAM Team in your region, how would you engage the community to make them aware of this initiative? Would you leverage the media as a partner to accomplish this?

Threat Case Tracking: How do you envision tracking Threat Cases (TCs) identified by your TAM Team? The general performance measures identified by the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the TVTP program are outlined below:

- Number of Threat Cases (TCs) handled
- Number of referrals for outside services by service type
- Anonymized case status data referred to law enforcement
- Anonymized case studies illustrating the impact of threat management

TAM Team Funding: TAM Teams generally require minimal funding to "stand up", but they do require time, leadership, and commitment. Does your region anticipate needing any funding initially for this effort?

PROGRAMMATIC SUPPORT FOR TAM TEAM DEVELOPMENT

Training and Technical Assistance: What training or technical assistance do you anticipate needing from DHSES to support this effort in your region?

Questions/Comments: Do you have any additional questions, comments, or concerns not previously address that you'd like to highlight?

ROCHESTER THREAT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (ROCTAC): COMMITTEE MEMBER & PARTICIPATING MEMBER AGENCY AGREEMENT

- The Rochester Threat Advisory Committee (ROCTAC) is comprised of select representatives from Participating Member Agencies (PMA). The ROCTAC acts as a central clearinghouse of information flow specific to situations, herein referred to as Threat Cases (TC), where the risk of violence is assessed to be imminent and/or a cluster of risk factors and warning behaviors commonly associated with elevated risks for targeted violence are present.
- ROCTAC assists PMA's with the development of balanced intervention and a case management strategy for TC's presented to the committee. The ROCTAC acts solely as an advisory group. ROCTAC cannot mandate PMA's implement or act on suggested intervention and case management strategies. ROCTAC does not dictate policy or procedural change within PMA's other than requirements set forth in this PMA agreement.
- 3. Members of the ROCTAC do not act in the capacity of traditional law enforcement taskforce members who have dual responsibilities to follow policies and procedures of the task force sponsoring agency and their own agency. The ROCTAC member shall maintain the standard protocols and interests of its agency and follow all rules and regulations set forth by its agency. For example, members shall comply with matters of confidentiality and sharing of sensitive information in accordance with its agency polices and any applicable laws.
- 4. ROCTAC serves as a resource for the community to improve targeted violence threat response protocols by providing multidisciplinary expert advice and seamless sharing of threat information across systems. ROCTAC uses a multidisciplinary restorative approach to prevent acts of targeted violence that balances the safety needs of the public with the health and wellness needs of the person at-risk for committing an act of targeted violence.
- 5. In support of ROCTAC's mission each PMA agrees to the following:
- a. ROCTAC members will meet on a to-be-determined basis either weekly or bi-weekly and be available for emergency ROCTAC callouts.
- b. Executive management from PMA's will meet quarterly to assess the operation of the ROCTAC and strategize how to improve ROCTAC operations.
- c. ROCTAC members will comply with all federal and state laws, agency-specific policies and regulations relating to matters of confidentiality and information sharing.
- d. PMA's shall protect and safeguard the integrity of all confidential information lawfully shared in-furtherance of the ROCTAC mission for purposes other than advancing public-safety or caretaking of the subject of the threat case. If disclosure is permitted, protecting the privacy interests of all involved parties should be a priority through the standard of "minimal disclosure" of information to inform intervention, case management, and protective actions. Confidential information does not include nonidentifying data collected and analyzed by ROCTAC or its designee to inform policy and operations of ROCTAC and advance the discipline of threat assessment through research and scholarly publication. Sharing of otherwise confidential information through ROCTAC members' normal chains of command and on a need-to-know basis is authorized.
- e. Public statements by PMA relating to ROCTAC will be coordinated and agreed upon by the executive management of all PMA.
- f. ROCTAC members will avoid engaging in activities that can be considered a conflict of interest that may impair objectivity or cause undue harm to interested parties.
- g. ROCTAC members will not seek financial gain outside their agency's compensation based solely on the member's participation in the ROCTAC.
- h. ROCTAC members will not engage or assist in threat assessment investigations by unqualified persons.
- i. ROCTAC members will ensure agency representative(s) attend and satisfactorily complete a training course approved by the ROCTAC and to commit to continued training and education in targeted violence threat assessment and management.

Appendix D – Sample TAM Team MOU – ROCTAC MOU

In furtherance of maintaining competencies, it is highly recommended that ROCTAC members seek professional certification in threat management and consider membership with the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals or other recommended appropriate certification.

- j. ROCTAC does not require a financial contribution from any PMA; however, participation does require resources in the form of personnel, meeting space, and time commitments to wit: ROCTAC Coordination/Manager: On a yearly basis one PMA representative will be designated as the agency of record for committee coordination. The committee coordination agency will provide a suitable meeting location and administrative support to facilitate notifications to all members relating to team logistics such as changes in scheduled meeting times and locations and emergency meetings. The Sheriff of Monroe County will assume duties as the initial agency of record for committee coordination for the first year of ROCTAC existence.
- 6. All parties to this agreement acknowledge that this agreement does not preclude or preempt each of the agencies individually entering into an agreement with one or more parties to this agreement. Such agreements shall not nullify the force and effect of this agreement. This agreement does not remove any other obligations imposed by laws, agreements or policies to share information with other agencies.
- 7. Modification of this agreement shall be made only upon consensus of the PMA's. Such modification will be made with the same process followed in this agreement and shall include a written document setting forth the modifications, signed by all parties.
- 8. This agreement shall be in effect as of the date of the agreement is signed by the parties and shall renew automatically unless otherwise modified. It is understood that any party may terminate its participation in this agreement by submitting written notice to the other parties.
- 9. Each member agency will have its representative execute Page 5 of this agreement and return to the Office of Legal Counsel, Sheriff of Monroe County.
- 10. Appendix A will list all member agencies and will be updated as needed to reflect any gained or lost members of ROCTAC.
- 11. Appendix B is the ROCTAC Threat Assessment Instrument (TAI) (ROCTAC Form 1). An executed TAI will be the vehicle for presentation of a TC to the PMA. It is the responsibility of the presenting PMA to provide copies of the TAI to PMA's participating in the TC review. It is the responsibility to of the presenting PMA to collect any copies of the TAI upon completion of the process for disposition in accordance with their agency's policies.

AGREEMENT EXECUTION PAGE

Please complete and return to agency listed in paragraph 6

Participating ROCTAC Agency Name

Agency Representative Signature

Agency Representative Name Printed

Date: _____

w/ Ch 1, January 2019

APPENDIX A: MEMBER AGENCIES						
Office of the Sheriff of Monroe County						
Office of the District Attorney of Monroe County						
Fairport Central School District						
Fairport Police Department						
Willow Domestic Violence Center						
Villa of Hope						
United States Secret Service						
Roberts Wesleyan College						
Monroe County Office of Mental Health						
Monroe County Department of Public Safety						
Veterans Outreach Center						
University of Rochester						
Wegmans Food Markets						
Office of Court Administration, 7 th Judicial District						
Irondequoit Police Department						
Rochester Institute of Technology						
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, USDOJ						
Public Safety Committee, Monroe County Legislature						
Federal Bureau of Investigation						
People, Inc.						
Hillside Children's Center						
Nazareth College of Rochester						
Monroe County Child & Family Services						
Monroe Community College						
Rochester City School District – School Safety & Security Department						

Greece Police Department

AT-RISK International

East Irondequoit Central School District

APPENDIX B: ROCTAC THREAT ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (TAI) (ROCTAC FORM 1(SEE ATTACHED FORM 1)

ROCTAC THREAT ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (TAI)¹

This instrument is designed to assist in the investigation and management of potential target-violence

IF IMMINENT DANGER EXISTS, CALL LAW ENFORCEMENT

ROCTAC assists agencies with the development of balanced intervention and a case management strategy for cases presented to the committee. ROCTAC acts solely as an advisory group. ROCTAC cannot mandate agencies implement or act on suggested intervention and case management strategies. ROCTAC does not dictate policy or procedural change within agencies

- Complete the assessment through a multidisciplinary approach.
- Consider first using the least intrusive method of fact gathering and progress to more intrusive methods as risk factors cluster, accelerate, triggers become evident, or assessed level of dangerousness increases.
- Depending upon the situation, consider using other assessment instruments (i.e. domestic violence, workplace violence, suicide risk, etc.).
- Consider including representatives from partnering agencies, not necessarily represented within the team.
- Consider all available sources for information, including: relatives, social media, friends, coworkers, employment resources, neighbors, etc.
- Examine safety concerns and threatening situations using the following questions as an investigative guide.
- Protect and safeguard the integrity of all confidential information lawfully shared in-furtherance of the ROCTAC mission for purposes other than advancing public-safety or caretaking of the subject of the threat case.
- The reporting PMA is responsible for destruction of this TAI upon completion of the process. There will be no electronic distribution of this form once information has been added to it.

¹ The Presenting Agency shall provide copies of this TAI for meetings and reclaim copies after completion of the TA.

DATE:	Appendix D – Sample TAM Team MOU – ROCTAC MOU PERSON REPORTING:							
NAME: (Person of Conce	rn):	_DOB:	_AGE:					
ADDRESS:		-						
OTHER PEOPLE INVOLVED, DEMOGRAPHICS AND RELATIONSHIP:								

STEP 1: ASSESSMENT – DISCUSS, INVESTIGATE, AND DOCUMENT

Complete the following questions. Each question is a prompt for exploration of circumstances that may involve the escalation of aggression. Review the questions as an outline for a guided conversation investigating situational factors or concerns that suggest an increase in the risk of acted out aggression. Address each question with answers about the issue being explored rather than with yes or no responses. If the answer to a question is No or you are unsure, make note with a "No" or "Unsure" response.

- 1. How was the threat communicated?
- A. Were threats made directly, indirectly, as veiled or vague statements, or conditional to a demand or control?
- B. What was the form of communication (written, verbal, social media, visual, other)?

C. Were threats made as emotional reactions to perceived danger or attack (a seemingly targeted threat made in a reactively aggressive situation)?

Describe details of the communication, how it was received, the attacker's demeanor, etc.:

2. Are there expressed interests in possible targets, including, identifiable and available targets? Are there possible collateral targets or an indicated selection of backup targets or schedule options? Are targets clear or vague? Is the target the focus of the subject's grievance?

3. Have there been any strange, awkward or intimidating communications with potential targets? (Examples: Leaving notes, accusations, gifts, etc. The use of pre-operational surveillance or inquiry about security or testing emergency responses.)

4. Is there a perception that the situation or future is hopeless, desperate, unbearable or overwhelmingly stressful combined with a suggested inability to cope? (*Examples: "I'm fed up." "I'm at wit's end." "I just can't stand it anymore." "I can't live with the current situation." "This is the only option."*) (*Final act behavior: pre-breach preparations made by the person(s) posing a threat right before the threat is carried out. This can include acts like disseminating reasons for the attack or executing a last will and testament (Calhoun & Weston, 2009).*

5. Is there any indication of focused or inappropriate interest in acts of violence, terrorism, previous rampage/community attacks or attackers, anti-social characters, notorious criminals, murderers, or gangs (historical or fictional, such as research into past mass murder incidents for instructional guidance or a "game plan)?

6. Is there a noted grievance, justification and/or motive for violent action? (deBecker, JACA element-- Justification) (*Examples: expressions of control or justification such as, "you deserve it" or "I have no other choice."*) Grievance: A grievance is generally defined as the cause of someone's distress or reason for complaint/resentment; in threat assessment contexts, it takes on additional meaning to include a highly personal meaning for the subject, often fueling a feeling of being wronged and translating into behaviors related to a sense of mission, destiny, loss, or desire for revenge (Calhoun & Weston, 2003).

7. Does the person of concern have the intellectual and mental capacity to plan and act out in a premeditated manner? If capacity is limited, does the person believe that they have the capacity? (deBecker, JACA element-- Ability)

8. Has there been a novel act of aggression, seemingly unrelated to the usual warning signs and the attacker's primary target, which would appear to be testing the person of concern's ability to carry out an attack and the subsequent response? If known, Describe:

9. Is there a history of aggressive behavior that has recently increased in harm to others?

10. Does person of concern display empathy for others when they are hurt?

11. Have there been any recent behavioral changes, self-care changes, sleep disturbances, psychological changes, appetite changes, marked agitation, or a drastic change from agitation to relaxed or euphoric attitude? Have there been any changes indicating an escalation toward targeted violence? (*Examples: Lashing out or sudden calm as if settled on a plan. Can also include excessive risk taking to include sexual or financial risk taking*.)

12. Has there been any consideration and/or attempt to harm self? (*Examples: suicidal ideations, suicide attempts, increased violence towards others.*) (The subject's decision to end his or her life can lead to an act of targeted violence as a means of attaining fame or martyrdom in addition to their suicide attempt (Meloy, 2011)

13. Are weapons available, secure, or has there been an attempt to secure or possess weapons? What kind of weapons? What is the history of use, skill, and/or interest in weapons either through actual use or by proxy (gaming/simulation)? Is there a known incident when the person of interest carried a weapon as part of a (trial) approach to a target, (weapon did not necessarily have to be displayed or open)? (*Example: Suddenly carrying a weapon when he/she has not carried before, especially within the proximity of potential targets.*)

- 14. Has there been any noted attack related behavior?
- Ideation, planning (see next question), approach behavior, rehearsal, research, simulation, preparation, ceremonial acts (cleaning or preparation of weapons, wearing specific clothing, etc.), or scheduling.
- Stalking with/without approach behavior (being in proximity of target, even if not directly approaching), tracking movements of target through social media, social discussion or television; odd or disconcerting vandalism.
 - 15. Is there a noted or implied plan of attack? (It does not have to be a good or sound tactical plan.)

16. Has the person of concern stated or implied a perception that options are limited and the alternatives to violence are decreasing or lost? *If the subject was pursuing legal or nonviolent recourse for his or her grievance, what is the status of the action, still pending or finalized*? (deBecker, JACA element-- Alternatives) *(Example: The only perceived choice is to commit the act, "I've tried everything else, and there is nothing left to do."*)

17. Has the person of concern stated or implied an acceptance of the consequences from acting out in a violent manner? (deBecker, JACA element-- Consequences) (*Examples: "I'm ready to die." "If I can't have you, nobody can." "It's worth going to jail." Or a suggested ignorance of any actual consequences either because he/she has acted with impunity or has not been caught.*)

18. Are there destabilizing factors that decrease coping reserves and may increase the potential for the person of concern to resort to violence as a solution (illness, divorce, death of a loved one, financial crisis, termination of employment, perceived abandonment/rejection, humiliation, loss, arrest or pending negative criminal or civil action etc.)?

19. Has there been an event or experience that has triggered or may trigger the consideration of a violent act...a significant event that may act as final straw such as a loss of a significant inhibitor or the sudden introduction of a major accelerator to the path of violence? It is important to note that the loss or humiliation is in the eyes of the attacker and may not seem logical to a reasonable person. (Examples: humiliating experiences, custody hearings, job loss, tragedy, arrest or pending negative criminal or civil action etc.)

20. Are there any approaching significant dates (birthdays, holidays, anniversary of divorce, tragedy, humiliating event or other date)? Dates can be positive or negative.

21. Is there an absence or presence of positive social/emotional supports or other stabilizing factors that reduce the potential for people to resort to violence (vocation, avocation, family, pro-social beliefs, religious beliefs against violence, relationships, future goals, etc.)?

22. Do others have concerns? Do family, friends, co-workers, followers on social media, public safety entities and other bystanders have concerns? This can be significant if others are seeing concerning behavior. (Be sure to speak with these people and identify leakage or other important information.)

23. Are there social endorsements and support (in words and/or actions) of violent behavior and ideas from peers and/or family? Do peers and/or family have an excessive history of violence?

24. Are there psychological Factors/mental health issues that impact coping skills and stress management? Is there a history of poor self-control, intense and frequent fear or anger, hopelessness and despair or an indication of extreme

Appendix D – Sample TAM Team MOU – ROCTAC MOU

personality issue? Is there a history of Central Nervous System Trauma? Is the subject actively engaged in mental health counseling and/or taking medication? Is the subject receptive to mental health treatment?

25. Are there medical Issues that would cause a loss of hope such as extreme pain, serious or terminal illness?

26. Is there an indication of drug and alcohol use or abuse, excessive prescription drug use or addiction or recent unexplained changes in usage? (Example: the sudden reduction of use may suggest that the person of concern is cleansing and preparing for a more competent attack strategy.

27. Domestic Violence Issues:

- Nature of relationship and future. Can relationship be described as "intimate" (real or perceived close personal relationship, sometimes accompanied by physical or sexual contact, Jenkins, 2009).
- Shared/possible loss of residence, finances, children, friends, etc.
- Other enmeshments-close family ties on other side.
- Accelerators in relationship such as anniversaries, pending divorce, custody hearings, support hearings, etc.
- History of violence toward victim. Nature, level, frequency, etc.
- Arrest for or allegations of non-fatal strangulation event
- Weapons. Recent acquisition? Used to threaten?
- Use of intoxicants
- Stalking
- Communicated threats to victim's reputation, family, pets, etc.
- Partner's plan for ending relationship and anticipated reaction to the breakup
- Partner's perception of subject's reaction to protective orders and arrest if warranted.

Describe each separately:

Appendix D – Sample TAM Team MOU – ROCTAC MOU

Note: The above **list of risk factors** does not predict future violence, nor is it a foolproof method of assessing an individual's or group's risk of harm to others. It is not a checklist, profile, or an assessment tool that can be quantified. It is a guide designed to assist in the investigation of circumstances and variables that may increase risk for potential aggression and to assist in the development of a management plan. The examples used are to illustrate the risk factor and should not be the sole determinant in your assessment. Undue significance should not be placed on presence and/or absence of the specific listed behaviors. Furthermore, as circumstances change, so too does risk potential; therefore, if reviewing the results of this document after its completion, do so while being mindful of the dynamic nature of life, supervision, intervention, and the passage of time.

The **observations**, **opinions**, **and suggestions** discussed represent a product of the knowledge drawn from personal and collective investigative experience, educational background, specialized training, and research conducted by PMA's of ROCTAC and others, as well as from published academic research and known case facts. This advisory input is not a substitute for a thorough, well-planned investigation, and should not be considered all-inclusive.

The ROCTAC PMA analysis is based upon information available at the time this report was prepared and assumes that the information set forth is valid and complete. Should additional information or case materials become available later, certain aspects of this analysis may be subject to modification or change. All threats should be taken seriously, and all reasonable measures to minimize the risk of violence should be considered.

Concerning threat assessments, it is difficult to predict future behavior with certainty. This threat assessment serves as an advisory tool for those vested with investigative and operational responsibilities which may assist in identifying appropriate levels of concern based on research and experience. This assessment is not evidence of violence risk or criminal wrongdoing and is not suitable for use as the basis for testimony. Rather, the assessment is conducted to guide the appropriate allocation of resources and the prioritization of tasks. A threat assessment is only valid for the period assessed.

Environmental changes, medical conditions, neurocognitive impairments, medication (or the lack thereof), alcohol consumption, illegal drugs, personal conflicts, psychological disorders, traumatic events, or other factors can affect the thought process of an individual. These changes can result in violent acts when none were anticipated and complicate the process of attempting to assess the likelihood of violent behavior.

OPENING FOR ROCTAC MEETINGS

We are meeting today to assist the presenting agency(ies) with developing an intervention and management strategy for a person who they believe may be planning to commit an act of targeted violence.

Everyone is reminded to follow their agency's policies and practices and we ask that you not document anything discussed today, unless given permission by the presenting agency.

The details of the cases presented today are confidential and every effort should be made to safeguard those details.

All advice and/or referrals made to the presenting agency(ies) are only recommendations; any action taken is at the discretion, and direction, of the presenting agency(ies).